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the final analysis, the Knoll court seemed to sense this, as shown by its
attempt to distinguish Burdeau; in reality it based its decision not on
Ganbino but on the idea that judicial integrity and the concept of an
ordered society would be jeopardized were the courts to sanction
governmental illegality by permitting the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence.2" Though disfavoring Burdeau, the court of appeals seemed to realize that there is no present ground for overruling
that case. By distinguishing rather than disturbing, the court has avoided
direct confrontation with a Supreme Court precedent and, at the same
time, has undermined that precedent, for to distinguish a case which
seems clearly controlling does little to strengthen it as precedent.
W. LUNSFORD LONG

Civil Procedure-Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d)Disposition of Cases by the Court of Appeals after Granting
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
In the recent case of Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.,1 the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the procedure involved in using the
judgment notwithstanding the verdict2 at the appellate level in the federal system3 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(d).4 Neely was
a diversity action in which the jury awarded plaintiff damages in her
wrongful death action against defendant. After the verdict was returned,
defendant moved under Rule 50(b) for judgment n.o.v., or in the alternative, for a new trial. The trial judge denied both motions and ordered
judgment entered for plaintiff on the verdict. On appeal, the court of
appeals ruled that the evidence was legally insufficient to go to the jury
on the issue of negligence and ordered judgment n.o.v. for defendant.
Then, instead of remanding the case to the trial court for new trial
" Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960), notes that the courts
ought not to be a party to illegality by permitting the Government to use evidence

in violation of the Constitution.

1386 U.S. 317 (1967). This case has also been noted in The Supreme Court,
1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 218 (1967).
'Hereinafter referred to as judgment n.o.v.
' For a general treatment of the practice and procedure in the federal system
under Federal Rule 50, see F. JAmES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.22 (1965); 5 J.
50.01-.17 (2d ed. P. Kurland recomp. 1966) [hereMOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
inafter cited as MOORE]; Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 449 (1960).
' FED. R. Civ. P. 50(d). See note 22 infra.
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considerations, the court of appeals ordered the case dismissed.5 The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals, saying that
it was within the power of the court of appeals to order judgment n.o.v.
and to dismiss the case without giving the verdict winner an opportunity
to move for a new trial in the trial court.
Prior to the decision in Neely, the Supreme Court had always limited
the use of the judgment n.o.v. in the federal system because of its emphasis on the seventh amendment right to jury trial. So great was the
Court's reluctance to allow any infringement upon this right that when
the judgment n.o.v. device was first brought before the Court, it was
ruled unconstitutional in the federal system.' It was not until twentytwo years later that the Court relented and held the device constitutional
in a new form,7 which was incorporated into Rule 50 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The Court's grudging acceptance of
the judgment n.o.v. continued in later cases in which the Court laid
down a definite procedure to be followed at the trial court level if a
8
litigant wished to avail himself of the device.
It was only natural that when the Court first turned its attention to
appellate use of the judgment n.o.v., it displayed an even greater reluctance toward allowing a court to deprive a verdict winner of his verdict.'
The Court actually had two problems to face in this area. The first
concerned the conditions under which an appellate court could grant judgment n.o.v., while the second problem concerned the proper disposition
of the case by the appellate court once it had decided a judgment n.o.v.
was warranted. Concerning the former problem, the Court made it clear
from the beginning that the court of appeals has the power to grant
judgment n.o.v. only if a motion to that effect is first made at the trial
344 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1965).
' Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913). For a more
comprehensive treatment of this subject, see 5 MooRE 50.07.
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935).
8 For example, Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940),
established the rule that the trial court should also rule on any new trial motion
presented if the court decides to grant judgment n.o.v. This rule has been codified
in FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c) (1). Another example of the importance of following
the proper procedure in the trial court is that if the verdict loser fails to move
for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, the trial court is powerless
to grant judgment n.o.v. See 5 Moopm 50.08. The Court also stressed that the
trial judge could, in his discretion, order a new trial, even though a judgment
n.o.v, was warranted, where it was likely that the verdict winner could cure his
defect in proof in a new trial. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S.
212, 215-16, 218 (1947). treatment of this development, see 5 MooRE 50.12.
For a comprehensive
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court level. 10 As long as the verdict loser moves properly in the trial
court for judgment n.o.v., it is well settled" that the court of appeals
can review the sufficiency of the evidence and grant judgment n.o.v.' 2
In Neely, this issue of appellate power to grant judgment n.o.v. was not
presented because the verdict loser had followed the correct procedure
in the trial court.' 3
Neely does, however, focus on the second problem concerning appellate use of the judgment n.o.v.-the proper disposition of the case once
the court of appeals decides a judgment n.o.v. is warranted. Unfortunately, this problem has not received much attention from the Court in
the past, although it has arisen many times in the lower courts. 14 When
faced with this situation, appellate courts have frequently remanded the
case to the trial court without directions,'5 giving the verdict winner
an opportunity to invoke the discretion of the trial judge to grant a
new trial. Yet other appellate courts have done exactly what the court
of appeals did in Neely by granting judgment n.o.v. and ordering the
trial court to dismiss the action,' thus depriving the verdict winner of
an opportunity to invoke the discretion of the trial court. Despite earlier
dictum,' 7 it was not until Neely' s that the Supreme Court specifically

addressed itself to this problem of disposition.'"
" Two leading cases have established this proposition. In Cone v. West
Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212 (1947), the verdict loser failed altogether to move for judgment n.o.v. at the trial court level. Yet on appeal, the
court of appeals granted judgment n.o.v. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring
it fundamentally unfair for an appellate court to deprive the verdict winner of
his verdict until the trial court had first addressed itself to the question. Later,
in Johnson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952), the Court again
reversed the court of appeal's entry of judgment n.o.v. for the verdict loser
where the verdict loser had moved only to "set aside" the verdict at the trial
court level.
" Some commentators, however, have criticized appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence. E.g., C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 95, at 368 (1963).
"E.g., Neely v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317, 322 (1967). Cf.
28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1964).
13 386 U.S. at 325.
,For a summary of the cases in this area see 5 MOORE
50.15.
"E.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Barkdoll, 353 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1955).
"E.g., United States v. Fenix & Scisson, Inc., 360 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1966);
Kaminski v. Chicago, R. & I.R.R., 200 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1952).
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243, 253-54 (1940) (dictum).
When the Court granted certiorari in this case, it also granted certiorari in
another case, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 382 U.S. 914 (1965), and
posed similar questions to the parties. However, in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), the Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the court of appeals and consequently did not reach the questions presented in
the writ of certiorari.
"9Several writers, however, have anticipated this problem. See Kaplan, Annd-
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Since the judgment n.o.v. device was first incorporated into Federal
Rule 50 in 1938, the wording of the rule has undergone change to
clarify and codify the judicial tightrope that the Court had previously
laid down for litigants.2" When Rule 50 was amended in 1963, subdivision (d) was proposed 2 ' to handle the cases like Neely where the
trial court denies the verdict loser's motions for judgment n.o.v. and
new trial. The wording of Rule 50(d)2 reflects the developments in the
law until 1963 as laid down by the Supreme Court. For example, the
Rule takes for granted that the appellate court has the power to review
the sufficiency of the evidence and to reverse the trial court if necessary3 Yet the Rule does not explicitly address itself to the ultimate
power of the court of appeals in disposing of a case once the court
decides a judgment n.o.v. is warranted. The Advisory Committee's Note
to Rule 50 admits this omission and gives this explanation:
Subdivision (d) does not attempt a regulation of all aspects of the
procedure where the motion for judgment n.o.v. and any accompanying
motion for a new trial are denied [at the trial court level], since the
problems have not been fully canvassed in the decisions and the procedure is in some respects still in a formative stage. 24
In light of the Court's earlier reluctance in allowing appellate termination of a verdict winner's case,25 the Neely holding seems to represent a
significant departure from the attitude of the Court in the previous cases.
To reach such a decision, the Court surprisingly relied almost exclusively
on an interpretation of Rule 50. Justice White, writing for a majority
ments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (II), 77 HARV. L. REV.
801, 819-20 (1964); Comment, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict-Rule
50(b), 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 397, 400-02 (1956); Note, Rule 50(b): Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, 58 CoLum. L. REv. 517, 524-25 (1958).
20 Three of the leading cases in this area were Johnson v. New York, N.H. &
H.R.R., 344 U.S. 48 (1952); Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S.
212 (1947); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940).
2131 F.R.D. 643 (1962).
22
FED. R. Civ. P. 50(d):
If the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is denied, the
party who prevailed on that motion may, as appellee, assert grounds entitling him to a new trial in the event the appellate court concludes that the
trial court erred in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict. If the appellate court reverses the judgment, nothing in this rule
precludes it from determining that the appellee is entitled to a new trial,
or from directing the trial court to determine whether a new trial shall
be granted.
Id.
2" "If the appellate court reverses the judgment ...
2FED. R. Civ. P. 50, Advisory Comm. Note, 31 F.R.D. 646 (1962).
" See cases cited note 20 supra.
"
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of six justices,2" rejected the idea of an automatic remand by the appellate court upon reversal of the trial court's rulings under Rule 50(d),
saying such a rule would not serve Rule 50's purpose of speeding litigation and avoiding unnecessary retrials. The Court said that any right
to a new trial for the verdict winner lay in the hands of the court of
appeals: "Jurisdiction over the case then passed to the Court of Appeals
and petitioner's right to seek a new trial after her jury verdict was
set aside became dependent upon the disposition by the Court of Appeals
under Rule 50(d). '"2 Looking at the wording in Rule 50(d), the Court
found nothing in it expressly denying to the court of appeals the power
of reversal and dismissal, and inferred from this an intent to allow
such power.29
Despite the simplicity of this approach, Justice Black in his dissent
argued that Rule 50(d) must be interpreted in the restrictive light in
which it evolved,8" and if viewed in this manner, the failure of the Rule
expressly to grant the power of reversal and dismissal must mean an
intent to deny such power to the court of appeals.8" Whereas the majority interpreted Rule 50(d) to be permissive in the sense that the court
of appeals may remand or dismiss a case after entering judgment n.o.v.,
2 The Court addressed itself solely to the procedural problem involved and
did not review the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence, saying the writ of
certiorari did not cover this question. Justices Douglas and Fortas entered an
opinion concurring in the construction of Rule 50, but thought the evidence was
sufficient to go to the jury. Justice Black dissented on the grounds that the
evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, and that he disagreed with the construction of Rule 50. 326.
27386 U.S. at
2

8Id. at 324.

" Id. The Court also rejected the applicability of FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c) (2),
which provides: "The party whose verdict has been set aside on motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict may serve a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59 not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict." The Court said this provision was applicable only in those
cases where the trial court had granted the motion for judgment n.o.v., whereas
in this case, the trial court had denied the motion. justice Black, however, argued
in his dissent that Rule 50(c)(2) should apply. Utilizing the logic of the
majority in their interpretation of Rule 50(d), Justice Black argued that nothing
in Rule 50(c)(2) expressly indicates that a verdict winner loses his right to
move for a new trial in the trial court if that court's entry of judgment n.o.v.
against him is on the direction of an appellate court rather than on its own
initiative. 386 U.S. at 340.
"One writer has described the Supreme Court's treatment of Rule 50 as
follows: "At the hands of the present Supreme Court, with its great-perhaps
exaggerated-reverence for the supposed benefits of jury trial, this rule has been
narrowly interpreted so that he who would have its benefit must indeed walk a
CIVIL
tightrope." F. JAMES,
21386 U.S. at 340-41.

PROCEDURE

§ 7.22 at 334 (1965)

(footnote omitted).
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Justice Black pointed out that the rule is really permissive toward the
verdict winner, not toward the court of appeals. It says that the verdict
winner "may, as appellee, assert" his grounds for a newtrial to the court
of appeals. 2 Nowhere does it say he must do so to protect his right to
a new trial. Therefore, Justice Black concluded that the case could not
be dismissed until the verdict winner had been given an opportunity to
move in the trial court for a new trial.
This conflict between Justice Black and the majority on the proper
interpretation of Rule 50, especially Rule 50(d), reveals what should
have been apparent from the beginning-the Rule simply does not explicitly answer the disposition problem." Whatever the basis of the
Court's opinion in Neely, however, its effort to deal with this question
requires interpretation. The most obvious interpretation of the case is
a literal one; any right to a new trial for the verdict winner now lies
within the discretion of the court of appeals. In this light, Neely represents a radical departure from the Court's previously displayed reluctant
attitude3 4 and deals the verdict winner in the federal system a damaging
blow. The Court is now willing for any appellate court not only to
review the sufficiency of the evidence, but also to terminate the case.
This literal interpretation of Neely raises the fundamental question
of whether the court of appeals is actually the proper forum in which
the verdict winner should have to seek his new trial. A long line of
state and federal cases require that the trial court, not an appellate court,
decide a new trial issue.3 5 Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.s" is
illustrative:
Determination of whether a new trial should be granted or a judgment
entered under Rule 50(b) calls for the judgment in the first instance
of the judge who saw and heard the witnesses and has the feel of the
case which no appellate printed transcript can impart....
. . [A] litigant should not have his right to a new trial foreclosed
without 3having
had the benefit of the trial court's judgment on the
7
question.
*

See note 22 supra.
a, See cases cited note 20 supra.
'5 "But the grant or denial of a new trial is primarily addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, which normally has a feel for the case that an
appellate court usually does not have.. . ." 6A MOORE 59.05, at 3735 (footnote
omitted). This point has been recently re-emphasized in Iacurci v. Lummus Co.,
See note 44 infra and accompanying text.
387 "330
U.S. 86
212 (1947),
U.S.(1967).
'*

"See note 24 supra and accompanying text.

I"d, ; t 216-17,

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

Although the facts differed in Neely and Cone in that Cone dealt with
the power of the court of appeals to grant judgment n.o.v. where the
verdict loser failed to make the proper motion in the trial court,8 8 the
Court did indicate in dictum that the court of appeals would have been
powerless to dismiss the case even if the verdict loser had moved properly
in the trial court for judgment n.o.v.3 The Court rejected a suggestion,
adopted now in Neely, that the verdict winner should have to claim his
right to a new trial in the court of appeals.40
There is one crucial fact in Neely that indicates, when considered in
conjunction with some of the Court's language, another possible interpretation of the case more in line with precedent: at no time did Miss
Neely try to state to the court of appeals the grounds entitling her to a
new trial.4 This fact, plus the Court's statement in Neely that the court
of appeals should remand some cases,4 could be taken to mean that
the verdict winner must present his grounds for a new trial in his appellate brief or face dismissal. If he does state his grounds, however, or
if they readily appear in the record,43 then the trial court may still be
the proper forum to decide most questions.
It is arguable that one recent Supreme Court case supports this analysis. In Jacurci v. Lummus Co.,4 4 the procedural setting was similar to
that in Neely. After a special verdict by the jury for plaintiff, defendant
moved for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial. The trial judge denied both
motions. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court, ordering judgment n.o.v. and a dismissal of the case. Contrary to the result
in Neely, however, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals,
saying Jacurci was one of those cases which should be remanded to the
trial court for consideration of a new trial.45 In a tone distinctly pre8 See

330
"Id.

note 10 supra.

U.S. at Black
218. emphasized this point in his dissent. See 386 U.S. at 341.
Justice
Implicit in this course of action was an assumption that the case would
be remanded to the trial court for consideration of the new trial issue should
the court of appeals reverse. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12-13, Neely v. Martin
K. Eby Constr. Co., 386 U.S. 317 (1967).
386 U.S. at 325, 329.
The Court said that it was incumbent upon the court of appeals to consider
the new trial question in light of its own experience with the case although the
verdict winner never presented grounds for a new trial in her appellate brief.
Id. at 329-30.
"387 U.S. 86 (1967).
"'The Court did not, however, go so far as to say that every time possible
grounds for a new trial were evident on appeal the verdict winner automatically
would be entitled to a remand to the trial court. Instead, the Court limited the
decision to the particular facts involved.
41
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Neely, the Court said that the trial judge was in the best position to
rule on the issue of a new trial.46 Justice Harlan vigorously dissented,
adopting the literal interpretation of Neely, and stated that the decision
placed the possibility of remand within the informed discretion of the
court of appeals." Finding no manifest abuse of this discretion, Justice
Harlan saw no reason to reverse.
Only later cases can clarify the true meaning of Neely and Iacurci.
At this point, however, several observations can be made. First, Neely
has at least effectively changed the wording of Rule 50(d) from a permissive indication to the verdict winner that he may, as appellee, assert
his grounds for a new trial in his appellate brief, to a strong warning
that he had better do so or risk dismissal. Secondly, if the Court meant
in Neely to give the power of dismissal to the court of appeals only
when no new trial grounds were presented or were evident from the
record, then the choice of words in Neely leaves this point in need of
clarification. Thirdly, whatever the rule in Neely may be, its application
to the particular facts in the case seems unfortunate, because the record
revealed no independent consideration by the court of appeals of possible
grounds for a new trial for the verdict winner.4 8
One possibly critical effect of Neely will be its interpretation by
the courts of appeal. It seems likely that most appellate courts
facing a heavy backlog of cases will construe Neely literally, as did
Justice Harlan in Iacurci, to vest ultimate disposition of a case in their
hands. 49 Thus, until the Court clarifies its meaning, the prudent practitioner also should take Neely literally. To do so leaves two courses of
action open to the verdict winner who finds himself in Neely's position.
First, he can do exactly what the Court suggests: state his grounds for
a new trial in his appellate brief. In light of the uncertain value of this
alternative, a second and perhaps wiser course of action would be for
the verdict winner to ask the trial judge for a conditional grant of a
"0387 U.S. at 88.
'7Id. at 88-89.
"The Court assumed that the court of appeals had not ignored its duty in
this area, though it did say it would have been better if the court of ap-

peals had included this consideration in the record. 386 U.S. at 330. Also,

Justice Black raised the point in his dissent that since the Court held for the
first time that the verdict winner had to raise his grounds for a new trial in
his appellate brief or risk dismissal, it would have been fairer to have given
Neely a chance to go back to the court of appeals and present her grounds.
386 U.S. at 342-43.
"E.g., O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1967); Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. Schreffler, 376 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1967).
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new trial before going to the appellate court." This procedure is awkward, however, since the verdict winner must argue on the one hand
that the verdict be upheld and a new trial be denied the verdict loser, yet
must also show errors committed entitling himself to a new trial should
the appellate court reverse. Assuming a literal interpretation of Neely,
this complex procedure may be the only way left to insure that the verdict winner will receive the benefit of the trial court's discretion in new
trial considerations.
In addition to possible judicial errors committed at trial, it is also
possible for a trial judge to grant a new trial as a matter of grace when
there is a good reason why the verdict winner should be given another
chance to prove his case. For this reason, it is common for a verdict
winner to argue to the trial judge in response to the verdict loser's motion
for judgment n.o.v. and new trial that the verdict ought to be upheld
and the new trial denied the verdict loser; but that if the trial judge is
contemplating giving a judgment n.o.v., then the verdict winner at least
deserves a new trial to cure his defect. As in the case of prejudicial
error, a verdict winner who wants to make certain that the trial judge
has an opportunity to rule on this question must also argue these grounds
to the trial judge for a conditional grant of a new trial before going to
the court of appeals. Yet it is even more awkward than in the
case of prejudical error for the verdict winner to argue conditionally
for a new trial to cure a possible defect in his proof before any court
has said there was a defect. Of course, the verdict winner could make
his argument to the court of appeals, but there would seem to be a
fundamental difference between asking an appellate court staring at a
cold transcript for a new trial as a matter of grace and making this
request to the judge who saw and heard the case and who thought the
verdict should stand in the first place.
Clarification of the meaning of Neely and Iacurci is needed. As the
history of drafting, amending, and interpreting Rule 50 indicates, this
will be a difficult task because many conflicting considerations are involved in attempting to formulate precisely a rule of practice in this
critical context. But it is suggested that this clarification should be made
with two points in mind. First, it is probably not possible for a litigant
to make a meaningful argument for a new trial when he is a verdict
winner at the time of framing and presenting this argument. Secondly,
the new trial argument becomes even more tenuous at the appellate level
o See sources cited in note 19 supra for a discussion of this alternative,
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than at the trial court level. Allowing the verdict winner the right to
argue conditionally for a new trial either at the trial court level or the
appellate level seems to ignore the practicalities of advocacy, and indeed
of human nature. Only a verdict winner who has been deprived of his
verdict can argue meaningfully for a new trial, and he should have the
right to argue his case to the trial judge who saw and heard the case.
RALEIGH
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Constitutional Law-Public School Authorities Regulating
the Style of a Student's Hair
The availability of public education is often subject to compliance
with school regulations governing student appearance and conduct.
Courts have jurisdiction by way of mandamus or otherwise to review the
legality of such regulations and may order reinstatement or enrollment
when the exclusion is made pursuant to regulations that are unreasonable, arbitrary, or discriminatory, or when the exclusion infringes upon
some constitutional right.' Following this standard, courts have upheld
3
2
expulsion for using cosmetics, wearing objectionable clothing, smoking,
serving liquor to other students,4 marriage,5 creating school bus disturbances,0 and even writing a letter to a newspaper in which the student
' 7
was "fanatical in his [favorable] views as to atheism.
In Ferrellv. DallasIndependent School District,8 a public high school
principal refused to enroll three students-members of a musical group
known as "Sounds Unlimited"-because the length and style of their
hair could "cause commotion, trouble, distraction, and a disturbance in
school."'" The students claimed that the regulations prescribing appearance constituted an arbitrary and unreasonable violation of their consti'The Legal Status of the Public School Pupil, 26 N.E.A.

RESEARCH BuLL.

28 (1948).
Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538 (1923).
'Tanton v. McKenney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
'State v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
' State v. Board of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957).
'In re Neal, 164 N.Y.S.2d 549 (Child. Ct. 1957).
Robinson v. University of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
'392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 37 U.S.L.W. 3127 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1968).
OId. at 698.
'Old.at 699.

